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MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE: WHO'S IN CHARGE?

A Current C2 Perspective

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Syllabus.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

16 May 2003

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## Abstract

### MARITIME HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE: WHO'S IN CHARGE?

#### A CURRENT C2 PERSPECTIVE

A significant outcome of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, was the major re-organization of the U.S. government in order to re-prioritize the nation's focus on homeland defense and homeland security, specifically with the creation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Although terrorists have the potential for delivering their attacks from three dimensions (air, land and sea), this paper addresses the maritime domain dimension, with a specific focus on the C2 structure.

The difference between homeland *defense* and homeland *security* is articulated to manifest the different missions assigned to DOD and the new DHS. With the Navy and Coast Guard as the primary maritime forces in these roles, they need to be able to operate jointly, in a seamless manner, and with the assistance of multiple external agencies. Interagency cooperation with an unhampered unity of effort, along with a robust command, control, and communications (C3) capability, are just a few requirements needed to effectively carry out the homeland security and defense missions.

An unfinished C2 construct, an aged Coast Guard inventory, and new requirements placed on an already heavily tasked Navy are just some examples of the issues facing these new organizations as they continue to stand up and grasp the full scope of their responsibilities. The most important focus needs to be the completion of the C2 organizational construct – a task that should have already been completed and incorporated – so that a commander can be identified and his intent provided to the lower echelons so that the maritime domain is properly secured and defended.

**INTRODUCTION** September 11, 2001, will forever be known as the day that changed everything...or at least a lot of things. Since that unforgettable day, the United States has implemented a number of security measures to help prevent another airline related incident. It has created an entire new cabinet-level position in the government and has stood up another combatant commander in the Department of Defense's Unified Command structure.<sup>1</sup> As U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) continues to develop its operational concept for defense of the American homeland, and the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to mold itself into an effective organization, the United States remains ever susceptible to another attack on its sovereign territory – an attack that could be less intricate, yet more catastrophic than the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Border patrol procedures and effectiveness have seen vast improvements due to increased manning and vigilance along the Canadian and Mexican borders. The Federal Aviation Administration and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) have reviewed and updated procedures and improved upon a pre-9/11 relationship of sound and effective cooperation.

What has been done, however, to improve security at the nation's coastline and seaports? Many U.S. seaports have undergone complete transformations as far as security measures are concerned; but are containers and merchant traffic in our ports under the same scrutiny as the passengers on line at the nation's airports? Is the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), as lead federal agency (LFA) in the maritime homeland security mission,<sup>i</sup> able to stop and inspect every sea-going vessel before it ties up to a pier, dock, or anchorage in the heart of a city's harbor district? Is the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) now able to inspect more than two to three per cent of the over 5,000,000 containers that enter the country each year?<sup>ii</sup> These are the questions many experts in the U.S. government are addressing in order to

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<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A, Unified Command Plan schematic of geographic areas of responsibility.

develop a concept of operations to meet these security challenges. It's a task that needs to begin with the development of an integrated maritime security/defense structure constructed from existing national assets from the Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS – specifically the U.S. Navy (USN), USCG, and USCS – as well as the FBI and CIA.

From a Homeland Security/Defense standpoint, the threat axis of terrorism is three-dimensional: it can come from the land, from the air, and from the sea. All are avenues available to terrorists in carrying out an attack on the U.S. homeland. This paper solely addresses the maritime threat with a focus on how the United States needs to organize its command and control (C2) structure in order to deter a terrorist threat and prevent a terrorist attack in the maritime dimension while simultaneously keeping the homeland's maritime domain safe and secure. The "*status quo ante 9/11*" C2 structure will be unable to meet this new threat. One of NORTHCOM's charters must be to revise the existing relationships between the Coast Guard, Navy, and other supporting agencies, and develop an organizational structure with the means to defend against a maritime threat. Likewise, DHS and DOD must organize in such a way that their C2 structures complement each other.

**WHERE THE UNITED STATES IS TODAY** One of the most confusing issues facing the agencies involved in the security and defense of the homeland is determining the difference and/or boundary, if any, between homeland defense and homeland security. When does homeland security lend itself to homeland defense, or does homeland defense at some point become homeland security? Are the two terms synonymous and interchangeable, or are they different, but occurring at the same time? These questions not only need to be answered, but the many participants in the process must understand the answers. *Webster's* defines the

term security as “measures taken to guard against espionage, sabotage, crime, or attack.” Defense is defined as the “means or method of driving danger or attack away from oneself, one’s team, or another.” Given those definitions, one can logically derive that defense follows security, as defense is now required because the security effort failed. However, when reading NORTHCOM’s mission statement with regard to homeland defense, it states, “Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression against the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility.”<sup>iii</sup> The terms “deter” and “prevent” sound awfully similar to “guard against” in the definition of security. The Coast Guard’s homeland security mission statement reads: “To protect the United States Maritime Domain and the United States Maritime transportation system, and deny their use and exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks on United States territory, population, and critical infrastructure.”<sup>iv</sup> Given these mission statements, it can be observed, then, that one does **not** follow the other. In actuality, they are two operational concepts that should be ongoing simultaneously. The President defines homeland security in his *National Strategy for Homeland Security* as, “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks.”<sup>v</sup> The Department of Defense, on the other hand, defines homeland defense as, “the military protection of U.S. property, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression. It also includes routine steady-state activities designed to deter aggressors and to prepare U.S. military forces for action if deterrence fails.”<sup>vi</sup>

The Coast Guard role in Maritime Homeland Security is the LFA with a resultant command and control organization designed such that DOD plays a supporting role to



USCG. Conversely, in the Maritime Homeland *Defense* mission, USCG plays a supporting role to DOD, where DOD is the LFA. Here alone lies a significant C2 problem if both missions are to be ongoing simultaneously. Moreover, the terms Homeland Security and Homeland Defense are spoken so freely that many think they are synonymous and have not even realized there is a difference.

When speaking of Maritime Homeland Security and Defense, the focus is on the maritime domain of the United States, which encompasses the maritime borders, ports, coastal approaches, and the boundaries and seams between them.<sup>vii</sup> More than any other dimension mentioned above, the defense of this domain is the most daunting. There are 95,000 miles of coastline to defend and over 350 seaports<sup>viii</sup> to keep secure. On top of that, 7,500 foreign flagged merchant vessels completed 51,000 port calls on U.S. ports in 2001, which included the handling of over 5,000,000 containers in these ports. Prior to September 11, 2001, the U.S. Customs Service was only able to inspect two to three per cent of those containers<sup>ix</sup> based on manpower and the sheer volume of goods coming into the United States.

These spectacular numbers were not given much concern when it came to the national security of the American homeland prior to 9/11. It was not until the government leaders sat down to revamp the strategy for homeland defense, that the magnitude of merchant shipping operating in U.S. waters appeared so daunting. When they got together with the theorists and war gamers to look at the probable scenarios for future terrorist attacks, the vulnerability of the maritime domain of the United States was determined to be a significant threat to national security.

The security and defense of the homeland's maritime domain, then, took on a whole new focus. The federal agencies assigned to meet these newly recognized threats were the Department of Transportation (DOT), Treasury Department, Department of Justice (DOJ), and DOD – specifically, the USCG, USCS, INS and USN. The Coast Guard increased their patrols, Customs officials increased the numbers of inspections, and the Navy recalled many reservists to man their port security and inshore boat units; with all entities significantly increasing their awareness. The longer-term effects saw the establishment of a new department in the federal government – DHS, and the reorganization of DOD's Unified Command Plan (UCP), including the creation of a brand new unified command – NORTHCOM – which took over the duties of NORAD. The UCP reorganization also shifted defense of the contiguous homeland from U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to NORTHCOM.<sup>x</sup> This federal government transformation brought the USCG, USCS, and INS (portions) under the new DHS, vice DOT, Treasury, and DOJ respectively.<sup>xi</sup>

Has this reorganization helped improve the security and defense of the homeland's maritime domain? In December 2002, the Coast Guard Commandant promulgated a new *Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security* and the Chief of Naval Operations published his *Guidance for 2003*. Both documents address the importance of homeland security and defense, but their tone is conceptually futuristic, and neither dictates specific courses of action to be carried out **today** in meeting the challenges facing the maritime services in fulfilling the missions of DOD and DHS. The reason for this could be that the new organizations themselves (NORTHCOM and DHS) are still in the process of organizing; the staffs are still determining what each agency and service “bring to the fight” and thus are not quite sure how yet to task the sea services; and, most importantly, the C2 architecture is still

being discussed. Until this C2 structure is defined, implemented, and exercised, the full capabilities of the Coast Guard/Navy team will not be brought to bear in this fight against terrorism – something that should already be in practice **yesterday!**

A review of current warfare publications provides a notional C2 structure that was developed for Naval Coastal Warfare (NCW) operations – specifically for defense of the homeland (Figure 1). This Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) concept manifests the significant role the Coast Guard plays in NCW during homeland defense operations. Although it is a supporting role to DOD, the Coast Guard maintains full tactical control of operations. This concept, however, can only be activated by declaration of war or at the direction of the President,<sup>xii</sup> neither of which has been done to date, and thus remains a notional construct.




Figure 1. Notional Homeland Defense Operational Organization<sup>xiii</sup>

Figure 2 below shows how DOD's Maritime Homeland Defense operational C2 organization is currently laid out. The Pacific Command's (PACOM) domain is chiefly Hawaii, whereas the bulk of responsibilities for defending the contiguous United States lie with NORTHCOM. Of note, too, are the three separate echelons that the Third Fleet Commander (C3F) is a part.




Figure 2. Maritime Homeland Defense C2 Organization

This construct begins to get cloudy when looking at the echelons beyond the fleet commanders. At some point the Coast Guard will begin to play a large role. According to current Navy doctrine, responsibility for harbor defense, harbor approach defense, and sea control in the U.S. littorals is shared between the Navy and the Coast Guard when required for the nation's defense.<sup>xiv</sup> It is the boundary in this littoral region that the transition and/or joint operation between the Navy and Coast Guard is yet to be defined. Nevertheless, in a homeland *defense* mission, the Coast Guard will be playing a supporting role to DOD.

In the Coast Guard's new role as LFA for maritime homeland *security*, a C2 organization diagram is shown in Figure 3. A review of this C2 structure reveals a Navy component in a supporting role only. The Navy currently supports the Coast Guard's




Figure 3. C2 Organization for Maritime Homeland Security Operations

homeland security mission through continued “loan” of their 13 Coastal Patrol vessels,<sup>xv</sup> operated by Navy personnel with Coast Guard detachments onboard in order to carry out law enforcement duties and responsibilities. The embarked Coast Guard detachment is required due to the Posse Comitatus Act.\* Additionally, the Navy provides the use of some of its maritime patrol aircraft and other vessels in alert status in support of the Coast Guard's

\* U.S. Northern Command, “<http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=newsfactsheet&factsheet=5>.”  
 Posse Comitatus Act: generally prohibits U.S. military personnel from interdicting vehicles, vessels and aircraft; conducting surveillance, searches, pursuits and seizures; or making arrests with civilian law enforcement authorities. There are exceptions that allow the military, in certain situations, to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in enforcing the law in the United States. This act does not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard which is unique in that it is both a law enforcement agency and a military service.

security mission. The maritime homeland security model is designed to meet the Coast Guard's strategic objectives:

- a. Prevent terrorist attacks within, and terrorist exploitation of, the U.S. Maritime Domain
- b. Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism within the U.S. Maritime Domain
- c. Protect U.S. population centers, critical infrastructure, maritime borders, ports, coastal approaches, boundaries and seams
- d. Protect the U.S. Maritime Transportation System while preserving the U.S. Maritime Domain for legitimate purposes
- e. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks in the U.S. Maritime Domain as either the LFA or as a supporting agency<sup>xvi</sup>

The Coast Guard expects to meet all these objectives as long as there is a quality level of effort among the other supporting agencies involved (those agencies not within DHS), such as the FBI and local law enforcement agencies (Harbor and Marine Police divisions of local police forces), and, of course, the Navy. Interagency coordination and cooperation is paramount to the Coast Guard's success in achieving its objectives. The interoperability of these various agencies depends not only on a strong unity of effort among them, but also an effective level of communication – both from a technological standpoint (such as common frequencies that all agencies can access), as well as from an information-flow standpoint. Sharing information with each other is essential, if not mandatory, for each agency to maximize effectiveness in their homeland security roles.

Can the Coast Guard accomplish all its stated missions, including the newest Homeland Security missions, and still fulfill all its commitments? Do they have the command and control structure in place to effectively take on all its new responsibilities in the maritime domain of homeland security? Is the Navy prepared to reinvigorate its role in Homeland Defense while simultaneously supporting the over-tasked Coast Guard in its Homeland Security missions? The answers to these questions are unknown as there has not

been a terrorist attack on the Homeland since the recent creations of DHS and NORTHCOM, although one might argue that the reason there has not been an attack is because the United States has been successful in its new endeavors to thwart potential attacks. Does the United States really want to wait until an attack in the maritime domain to force the issues on revealing the state of readiness for homeland defense and homeland security of its Coast Guard and Navy?

The Coast Guard has suffered from the “rejected runt of the litter” syndrome, whereby the modernization of its fleet and other hardware has been all but neglected when compared to the technological improvements and the new and improved hardware acquisitions that her sister services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) have enjoyed over the last couple of decades. Is the Coast Guard to blame for the shape that they are in, or are they a victim of being a low priority in the Department of Transportation’s budget allocation and resource availability? Some would argue that they didn’t voice their woes loud enough in recent years while accepting too many missions without sufficient resourcing. Whatever the reason, they have not been blind to its approaching decrepit state, and five years ago they initiated one of the most robust overhaul programs the Coast Guard has ever undergone: a 20-year, \$17B upgrade<sup>xvii</sup> to its aging fleet and communications systems – a must if they are to play such a large C2 role as figures 1 and 3 imply. This program, known as the DEEPWATER Project,<sup>\*</sup> received Congressional approval and has been ongoing now for the past few years, albeit in a relative infancy stage. Another significant event for the Coast Guard was their reassignment from DOT to DHS. As the LFA for Maritime Homeland Security, the Coast Guard is now a relatively high priority for funding and budget resources.

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<sup>\*</sup> DEEPWATER Project – see Appendix B

The Navy, on the other hand, seems hesitant to commit too many resources to the homeland defense mission, as it continues to fight budget battles in support of its aircraft and fleet modernization programs that have been in place before 9/11. Without their boss, SECDEF, pushing them to re-define their mission in an attempt to focus more on the defense of the maritime domain of the United States, the Navy will not succeed in that paradigm shift in the near term, especially when an established C2 structure is not in place to identify assets to support the maritime homeland defense and security missions. As noted in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security's statement before Congress, the role of DOD in homeland defense will grow from its traditional military missions in extraordinary circumstances, its natural disaster assistance in emergency situations, and its military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) in temporary situations such as special event security (e.g. Olympic Games); to meeting the aforementioned mission of NORTHCOM, in addition to providing MACA for both consequence management and crisis management.<sup>xviii</sup> Just how the Navy is going to fulfill those missions of NORTHCOM is yet to be determined.

**WHERE THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO BE** The fact that there are supposed to be two simultaneous missions ongoing where the Coast Guard and Navy are major players – the missions of Maritime Homeland Defense and Maritime Homeland Security – with no established common C2 structure in place, is rather disturbing. How then, do two totally different organizations, with interconnected but different missions, with two different C2 structures, headed by different masters – SECDEF (DOD) and the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) – but involving many of the same operational players co-exist in an effective manner? In the Homeland Defense mode, the Coast Guard is supposed to play a supporting



role to the Navy (whose forces are joined to make up a “National Fleet”);<sup>\*</sup> yet in the Homeland Security mode, the Coast Guard is playing a lead role, whereby, if needed, they request assistance from the Navy, but only after getting permission from the SECDEF to do so. This current C2 nightmare is a recipe if not for disaster, at least for confusion, and perhaps even failure.

DOD and DHS both have significant missions to plan for and to accomplish in defending the homeland and safeguarding it from another terrorist attack. From the maritime domain standpoint, regardless if the term defense or security is used, the missions amount to about the same, as the same agencies are going to be performing both missions in their individual capacities. What needs to be clearly defined, then, is how the Coast Guard supports the Navy in the defense mission and how the Navy supports the Coast Guard in the security mission. Right now, that “definition” does not exist in black and white. It is pertinent, then, that the defense and security of the maritime domain of the United States be controlled under an effective, robust C2 structure. It must be a system that relies heavily on coordination and cooperation between many agencies from all levels of government – federal, state and, local. The challenges lie in the combination of military and civilian components reporting to a single commander; something not impossible, but slightly unorthodox. In order to effectively accomplish the missions of Maritime Homeland Security and Defense, the participation and efforts of the following agencies and departments as a minimum are required: DOD (USN, SOF); DHS (USCG, Customs, INS); DOJ (FBI); CIA; NIMA; state maritime agencies (e.g. State Department of Natural Resources Police); local

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<sup>\*</sup> Bruce Stubbs and Scott C. Truver, America’s Coast Guard: Safeguarding U.S. Maritime Safety and Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, (Washington DC) 131. National Fleet: a cooperative concept between USN and USCG developed in September 1998 to share purpose and effort with a focus on operational integration of their multi-mission platforms, designed to meet the entire spectrum of America’s 21<sup>st</sup> Century maritime needs.

law enforcement agencies (e.g. Marine Police and Harbor Police divisions of municipal police departments); as well as international militaries and law enforcement agencies from Canada and Mexico. Attempting to place all of these departments and agencies under a single C2 structure would not only be disastrously complicated, but effectively unnecessary. Where the common C2 structure is needed is at the seam between the Navy and the Coast Guard, where a single commander can command and control all assigned Naval and Coast Guard forces. Additionally, once a C2 structure is constructed and placed into effect, a commander will be identified, his span of control will be defined, and he will be able to promulgate his commander's intent to the lower echelons – the importance of which cannot be overstated in this vast domain.

Figure 4 below is a notional C2 structure designed to meet both defense and security missions simultaneously. This recommended model manifests a relatively manageable span of control through an effective use of command echelons. The commander should be designated the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and his organization should be split between coasts, with standing Joint Maritime Interagency Task Forces designated as JMITF East and JMITF West. This model, though not a traditional neck-down organizational diagram, provides an effective C2 structure, and at the same time meets the mission requirements of both DOD and DHS. The JMITFs would have operational control over all USN and USCG forces assigned to the homeland security and defense missions on their respective coasts. When Navy support other than the coastal patrol craft is required, the JFMCC would go through the NCC to obtain it. He would answer all homeland defense issues through the NORTHCOM chain of command; and all homeland security issues through the DHS chain of command. The intelligence efforts on identifying possible




Figure 4. Notional C2 Organization for both Homeland Defense and Homeland Security Missions

suspect containers/vessels would be provided by the CIA (responsible for collating intelligence data from all 13 intelligence agencies) via a Joint Intelligence Center, directly to the applicable JMITF.

The significant number of support agencies involved in this C2 construct demands a high degree of interagency cooperation and unity of effort to successfully carry out the missions of Maritime Homeland Defense and Security, as they provide significant force multipliers to the Navy and Coast Guard. The local law enforcement agencies would work together with the Captains of the Port where their jurisdictions enmesh. This would be a two-way communications concept where the sharing of intelligence and the assistance with harbor and port security would co-exist. Federal, non-military agencies also providing support would be USCS, INS, and the FBI. Customs and INS, responsible for container security and immigration, are now organized under the new DHS, making the interagency issue less of a problem, as they get their rudder orders from the same boss as the Coast Guard. Intra-departmental policies can easily mitigate any potential command and control spurs.

Who should be who in this command structure? The Coast Guard is more familiar with the environment, as well as the capabilities and requirements of the federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and the coordination issues involved in working with them. Moreover, the Navy is not organized, trained, nor equipped for such a large coastal/harbor protection role, in addition to having no authority in law enforcement activities due to the aforementioned Posse Comitatus Act. Therefore, a Coast Guard vice admiral (three-star) should be assigned as the JFMCC, USCG two-star admirals as the JMITFs, and USCG one-star admirals as the regional commanders. This is essentially a Coast Guard-heavy organization, and rightly so.

So why even have a Navy commander in the organization chart at all? Why not have the JFMCC report directly to NORTHCOM on the Maritime defense side of the house? The answers to these questions are simple. If there is a potential threat to the maritime domain of the U.S. homeland, the goal of maritime homeland defense is to identify the threat as far away from the United States as possible. Consider the following scenario: if intelligence indicated a strong possibility that a weapon of mass destruction in deliverable form was being loaded onboard a vessel in Algeria, bound for Cuba, one can logically infer that there is great potential that this “dirty package” is intended for further transport to the United States, due to Cuba’s close proximity to the United States, and the relatively low target potential of Cuba. The most effective way to stop that weapon from reaching the United States would be to intercept it as soon as possible at a location with a high probability of success. The instrument to effect this interdiction would be by a Special Operations Force supported by a USN vessel on the high seas via maritime interdiction operations, something the Navy has been training for and honing through actual engagements for years. The NCC of NORTHCOM, as the senior Navy operational Surface Force Commander, should have the authority to order a naval unit(s) in the applicable Fleet to intercept the merchant vessel. Additionally, he would be able to coordinate with the Navy Submarine Commander to assign a submarine to shadow the vessel until the closest available surface vessel can arrive on station for the intercept. Furthermore, if required, he could work with the Naval Air Forces Commander to task a maritime patrol aircraft to the scene for tracking and identification of the suspect merchant. With the maritime domain, then, extended into the high seas, the Navy is much better prepared and established to conduct operations of this sort in support of both maritime homeland defense and security.

What else needs to be done to implement this C2 construct in order to create and sustain an effective organization in the maritime homeland defense/security role, besides drafting a notional wiring diagram? The communications equipment and other hardware of the command, control, and communications (C3) systems must be overhauled and upgraded immediately. All Coast Guard vessels working with or having the potential to work with specific Navy vessels must have the ability to communicate on common frequencies, both open and secure. They must be able to share data on a real-time basis to allow for a common operational picture among all units, land and shore-based, involved in their specific region of operations. With a threat that has the potential to bare its teeth at any moment, the focus has got to be on expediting the DEEPWATER Project timetable in order to provide the Coast Guard with the means to effectively carry out its new, ever-important missions in the maritime domain security arena (and thus lessening the need for Navy support).

The Navy, likewise, must determine which platforms they will allocate for the Maritime Homeland Defense and Security missions, and ensure their communication suites are compatible with those of the Coast Guard. DD(X) and LCS\* are current programs that are designed for littoral operations but which will not produce an operational platform for several years. The Navy CANNOT wait for these platforms to come on line before they acknowledge their role in the HLS and HLD defense missions – missions that need to be undertaken today. Whether the Navy decides to solely dedicate platforms in their current inventory for these missions, or whether they rotate platforms based on where they are in their Inter-deployment Training Cycle, a decision needs to be made and made now.

The sheer amount of coastline and square mileage of the area that encompasses the U.S. maritime domain dictates that a C2 structure with a split between East Coast and West Coast

areas of responsibilities would be too much for a single commander to handle, as his span of control would be unmanageable.

Once a C2 structure is decided upon, a common doctrine can be applied – a doctrine that would require little change from the way the Coast Guard does business now, but one, it could be argued, that would be a whole new way of doing business for the Navy (such as performing law enforcement duties). Whatever the C2 organizational structure ends up looking like, it must be determined as soon as possible.

**CONCLUSION** The events of September 11, 2001, not only set the stage for the United States declaring war on terrorism, but, more importantly, it brought the American people and our leader down from their Utopian outlook on a relatively risk-free domestic lifestyle to the reality that war and terror can reach the shores of their assumed impregnable fortress. Life as we knew it will never be the same. This costly wake-up call not only launched the U.S. military and other federal agencies into a global war on terrorism, but it shifted our National Security Strategy and primary focus to the defense and security of the American Homeland.

The organizational repercussions of this new focus affected every government agency, from the local level all the way to the federal level, most notably in the creation of a new unified combatant commander in the United States in the form of U.S. Northern Command, as well as the creation of an entirely new Executive Cabinet position – the Department of Homeland Security. The DHS was given the mission of securing our Homeland from an air, land and maritime threat. NORTHCOM was created and given the mission of homeland defense against a three-dimensional, asymmetric terrorist attack. It is the U.S. maritime domain dimension that is the most susceptible to security breach, and thus the most difficult to guard and defend. Because

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\* DD(X) = Next generation destroyer; LCS = Littoral Combat Ship

of the complex nature of protecting over 95,000 miles of coastline, 350+ seaports, and the approaches to all these ports, DOD and DHS must come up with a prioritized list of ports and harbor areas, based on strategic and economic importance, as well as populace, in order to determine which ones get allocated the limited resources that are available. The management of this prioritization concept requires that a rock-solid command and control structure be put into place, in addition to being ready to respond to any and all threats in the maritime domain. The United States has not yet achieved this required C2 capability and it is a work-in-progress to get there. Like the German Western Theater Command in preparing for a potential Allied amphibious landing (that eventually took place in Normandy), the U.S. finds itself in the unenviable position of not knowing when and where the enemy is going to strike next.

From a maritime domain aspect, the Coast Guard and Navy must have a clear vision as to what their roles and missions are in the homeland security and defense arenas, and they must be able to operate as a team in a seamless manner if the United States is going to win its terror battles in the maritime domain. A large portion of their success will rely on the effectiveness of the intelligence community in identifying and locating potential terrorists and/or their weapons from their origination points overseas – as far away from the American coastline as possible – and the ability to quickly act upon that intelligence data. Additionally, the United States cannot hold a homeland defense/security war game once a year for the foreseeable future to determine what would work best, when it should already have a structure in place and engaged today in all areas of maritime homeland defense. We are not there yet, and that should be a serious concern for both DOD and DHS. The longer we attempt to figure this out, the longer it will take to establish and delineate the responsibilities of each command echelon. Without a commander's intent, the lower echelons will operate on an ad hoc basis, trying their best to do what they think



is right in their own little piece of the maritime domain, like they are doing today, as they keep their fingers crossed that tomorrow won't bring the next terrorist attack.

A robust command and control system must be in place to allow flawless execution of security and defense missions. The time to achieve this is now, not five or ten years from now when "new" systems currently in development come online operationally. Programmers, planners, and Congress must give new priority and emphasis on the acquisition of technological upgrades that will allow the Coast Guard, Navy, and other supporting agencies in the maritime domain to be able to communicate effectively, securely, and in real time; and to expedite the fleet modernization build. Once these modern command, control, and communications systems are in place, the architecture will exist for an even more effective C2 structure. For now, a maritime homeland security/defense command and control construct must be in place in order for the operational commanders to operate without delay, without interruption, and without allowing the next terrorist plot on the Homeland to achieve fruition.

## APPENDIX A

### UNIFIED COMMANDER GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY



## APPENDIX B

### U.S. COAST GUARD'S DEEPWATER PROJECT SNAPSHOT

## **THE U.S. COAST GUARD'S DEEPWATER PROJECT\***

**A. What it is.** The Integrated Deepwater Systems Program, simply referred to as Deepwater, is a comprehensive modernization plan and performance-based project designed to replace the ships, aircraft, C4ISR, and logistics systems that will perform the Coast Guard's primary missions for the next several decades.

### **B. Why it exists**

1. Replace the approaching obsolescent major Coast Guard assets (nine classes reaching the ends of service lives)
2. Overcome the capability limitations of current assets, including the lack of interoperability with USN and other military services and federal agencies
3. Meet the increasing logistical demands because of aging assets and technology
4. Close the gaps in capability to meet the increasing demand for USCG services
5. To capitalize on new approaches to C4ISR
6. To exploit relationships among multi-mission system components
7. Recognition of the need for a long-term, balanced acquisition effort due to budgetary realities

### **C. Timeline**

- Concept initiated in 1996
- Program Executive Office established in April 2001
- Phase 1 of Procurement Strategy completed 15 June 2001
- Phase 2 of Proposal Submission by contractors completed 28 September 2001
- Contract awarded to Integrated Coast Guard Systems (equal partnership between Northrup-Grumman and Lockheed Martin) 25 June 2002

### **D. System Provisions**

1. Acquisition of up to 91 cutters, 35 fixed-winged aircraft, 34 helicopters, 76 unmanned surveillance aircraft
2. Upgrades to 49 existing cutters, 93 helicopters, and all C4ISR systems
3. Initial acquisition priority to the National Security Cutter, extensive upgrade to the 110-foot patrol boat, and the new Maritime Patrol Aircraft
4. Ability to build, maintain, and contribute to a common operational picture displaying the traffic and the targets of interest over a wide area. This will include access to real-time voice, video, data streams, and the relevant databases of other federal agencies
5. Technologies that will allow the Coast Guard to coordinate and operate with USN and NATO allies

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\* Data taken from the following two sources: Patrick Stillman and Gregory Giddens, "Deepwater Will Provide Homeland Security," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (August 2002), 38-40. Patrick Stillman, "Coast Guard's Future Depends on Deepwater", National Defense, (March 2002), 16-17.

## **E. Cost**

- Currently estimated to cost \$17B over three decades

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